#### Approved For Release 2003/03/28 : CIA-RDP80R01731R000900070003-7

### CONFIDENTIAL

1 September 1951

In your absence on Saturday, I called Mr. David E. Bell at the White House, who asked that our comments on the President's Standby Speech be furnished him immediately.

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Assistant to the Director

Enclosures

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
#### CONFIDENTIAL

## CONFIDENTIAL

1 Deptember 1971

FRANCIANDUM FOR: Kr. David E. Bell The White House

Confirming our telephone conversation this date, the Director of Central Intelligence has asked me to transmit this Agency's comments on the Standby Address of the President in the event the Communists break off Armiotice Negotiations in Korea.



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world -- with a tall tale like that.

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SUBJECT: CIA Comments on Draft of Standby Address for Fresidential Selivery in the Swent the Communists Break off Armistics Negotiations in Norea.

- 1. The draft assumes that the Communists will so act that it will be plain to all that they have broken off negotiations, but that there will not have been a new offensive. We believe that any such clear-cut break-off action is unlikely. In the recent bombing incident, the Communists, clumsy as they were in fabricating the incident, were clever in avoiding the onus of a definitive break. The USSR has generally been extremely careful to avoid the appearance of breaking off negotiations, and the Chinese Communists during the civil war generally renewed hostilities not after any definite break but while talks were still in progress or when they had been tacitly allowed to drop. In our view the two most likely contingencies are:
- (a) That the Communists will allow the talks to fade away, perhaps to the point where no further meetings are scheduled, but that they will not formally break them off. In this case, a Presidential speech throwing the blame on the Communists or warning them against starting a new offensive would presumably be more guarded than the present draft.
- (b) That the Communists will launch a major offensive, claiming that the US/UN disrupted the negotiations. At the same time they might possibly employ other arguments associated with the Japanese Peace Treaty. In this event, a Presidential speech would necessarily deal with the actuality of renewed aggression rather than merely with the threat.
- 2. The second half of the draft (from the 2nd paragraph of page 7 on) deals with the risk of war with the USSR in highly generalised terms, including reference to present US policies. But it also carries a strong hint of unspecified US offensive action (e.g., the 2nd paragraph of page 12 and the closing sentence of the draft), (See Tab 1). We suggest that initially emphasis be given to the UM determination to reach its objectives in Morea by whatever means are required, including the military moves already covered in pages 9-11 of the draft. Instead of stressing the possibility that Communist China might engage in aggressions elsewhere in Asia (which is not regarded as likely in US intelligence estimates), it would be better to emphasize that the probable intensification of the

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#### CONFIDENTIAL

war in Korea is likely to lead to full-scale war between the UK/US and Communist China. Thereafter, the responsibility of the USSE and the risk of general war between the US and the USSE could be considered, along with a statement of what the American people must do to meet this situation.

- 3. It is noted that no part of the draft is addressed directly to the fighting men in Korea. Explanation of the situation to those men appears vital.
- 4. On pages 5 and 6, (See Tab 2) reference is made to the fact that "no weapons, assumition, or simplemes" are produced in Communict China. Since Communict China does produce some assumition, it is suggested that this read: "no heavy reapons, artillary, tanks, or planes." (Note that there are two references.)
  - 5. On page 7, (See Tab 3) reference is made to Communist capabilities:
- (a) If reference is made to possible further Communist aggression in Asia (see comment 2 above), from an intelligence standpoint an early attack on India appears unlikely, though it may be desirable for policy reasons to refer to such an attack as an eventual possibility. We suggest the wording: "...against Indo-China, Durna, and the rest of Southeast Asia."
- (b) The possibility of attack in Western Europe might be emphasized more, together with an explicit statement that the Soviet Union is in a state of war-readiness both in Europe and in the Far East.
- 6. From the intelligence standpoint, it seems unwise at this time, when the suphasis should be on resistance to aggression, to suggest that the real American objective is the reduction of the Soviet orbit (reges 12 and 13).

Enclosure

cc: ES/NSC

Distribution: Orig & 1 cc-to White House (Mr. David E	. Bell)
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FIRST DRAFT August 23, 1951

My fellow Americans:

As you all know by now, the Eorth Korean and Chinese communists have broken off the armistice negotiations in Korea.

Tonight I want to tell you exactly what happened, what this means to all of us, and what we shall have to do now.

sors broke off armistice negotiations because they did not really want peace in Korea. They manufactured an excuse by claiming that a United Nations airplane bombed Excesses, the area where the armistice talks were going on. This was an obviously false assertion. A ten-year-old child could have seen through their false and silly claim. They didn't even do an artistic job of taking their evidence — a couple of pieces of sora; metal, and a little crater they apparently had blown themselves with a hand treased, was all they offered as proof of their claim.

The communists can't fool us -- or the rest of the free world -- with a tall tale like that. He know where all our airplanes were last night, and more of the was within miles of

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Kaesong at the time the bombing was supposed to have occurred.

off the araistice negotiations. They deliberately manufactured an excuse. This, together with their stalling, slippery tactics at every stage of the negotiations, is proof positive that they were not really interested in establishing an ar istice as the first step toward a peaceful settlement of the Roman conflict.

Instead, what they were trying to do was to let us to throw away everything we have gained by our flight for freedom in Korea. They wanted us to back off from our determination to stop aggression. They wanted us to agree, not to an archistice in Korea, but to a surrender of the brave people of Horoz to the desires of the aggressors.

They were simply trying to gain the objectives of their aggression by trickery, since we had prevented them from caining their objectives by force.

tinking teem, headed by Adalesi Joy, calcily and patiently insisted
that we would stop fighting only if a real armistics were negotiated,
while which there would be real paregrands against any aggression.

We would a real armistics -- not a surrenier.

The communist appreciates would not agree to the establishment of a neutral some between the opposing arctics, based on a de-

The communist appreciate would not appreciate that during the architect military arranges in Korea.

They would not appreciate absences from both sides would have complete econes to all parts of Karus to make sure that the architect terms were not violated. Finally, the semantists until not agree to exchange primaters of war.

These were the simple and straightforward prediction terms that we proposed. An armisting on any leasur terms would be a share

to work out an armistice along these lines needs only one thing ---

This is an extremely narious matter. It availy durkens the cuttion for world peace. It means that the ruless of the intermediated communicated appropriate or the newlines of the newlines medians of the lives of the South Kereen and Chinese makiness, have decided to continue their expression. These ruthless may, disrepaiding both chaple intermediated. Justice and the lives of the millions of man under their exercise.

We do not know their full intentions, but there is no decit that if they chease, they can being on a you would war, with all its hereor and devastation.

4.

But we were not tricked. General Ridgeway and his negotiating team, headed by admiral Joy, calculy and petianely insisted that we would stop fighting only if a scal armistice were negotiated, under which there would be real safeguards against new aggression. We wanted a real armistice — not a surregion.

The communist aggressors would not agree to the establishment of a neutral zone between the opposing armins, whad on a defensible line where we could protect paraelyes in a new attack was started.

armistice meither side would build up its military strength in Kores.

They would not agree that observers from both sides would have complete access to all parts of Korea to make sure that the armistice terms were not violated. Finally, the communists would not agree to exchange prisoners of war.

Those were the simple and straightforward or istice terms that we proposed. An ardistice on any lesser term to do be a character.

It is obvious on the face of it that the communist refusal to work out on armistice along these kines means only one thing — they did not want a peaceful settlement in Korea.

This is an extremely perious matter. It greatly darkens
the outlook for world peace. It means that the rulers of the international communist movement, contemptious of the combined moral
judgment of the 53 (?) free nations, careless of the lives of the
North Korean and Chinese soldiers, have decided to continue their
aggression. These ruthless men, disregarding both simple international
justice and the lives of the millions of men under their control,
have plunged on in their assault on human freedom and decency.

We do not know their full intentions, but there is no doubt that if they choose, they can bring on a new world war, with all its horror and devastation.

the aggressors have made. The North Korean communists could not have made this decision by themselves. The North Korean army was shattered last fall and, although it has been reorganized to some extent, it could not stand up now against the United Mations' forces.

decision to continue the aggression. They have taken stag ering losses —
over a million casualties in eight (?) months — several times the
United Nations' casualties in the same period. But the Chinese
communist rulors have immense reserves of manpower, and in mense disregard for human life, and they have decided to continue the slaughter
of their own people.

the Chinese communist rulers alone could not carry on the aggression any more than the North Koreans could. No heavy weapons, assumition, or sirplanes are produced in China. The aggression in Korea could not be long

continued without a flow of such equipment coming in to supply
the Chinese and North Korean communists. These heavy wenpons,
empunition, and mircraft are coming from only one place -- the
Soviet Union.



have agreed to support the continued communist aggression in

Kerea. The Soviet rulers cannot escape the responsibility — plain

to all the world to see — for the continued aggression in Euros,

and for all that may come from that.

the Chinese, and the Soviet rulers -- was made in the face of the combined moral judgment of the vast majority of the people of the world. The free peoples of the world have time and again voted in the United Hations that the communist etteck in Horea is plain, unvarnished aggression. It has been undertaken, and is being continued, by men who sneer and mack at the elementary ideas of justice and human freedom which underlies any civilized society.

If this aggression succeeds, the world will be well down the road to chaos and barbarism.

propaganda, the communist rulers cannot conceal from from usn —
nor even from their own people — the facts of their repeated
violations of the basic moral code of mankind. They are wrong —
criminally wrong — and the whole world knows it.

Their decision to continue the aggression in Korea immediately raises the possibility of further aggression.

The communist rulers may broaden the apprecian in Korea, by enlarging the area of fighting beyond the Korean peningular for example, we know they have men and equipment in places from which they could at any time be launched against Japan.

The communist rulers may broaden the aggression elsewhere in Asis: for example, they have men and equipment in places from which they could at any time be launched against Indo-China, Burma, or India.

The communist rulers may browien the aggression to

Europe or the Middle Mast; we know, for example, that they have

men and equipment in places where they could at any time be

launched against Western Germany, or Europelavia, or Turkey, or Iran.

Any of these actions could bring on world War III.

That is a fact we must face soberly and without shrinking.

I repeats the Soviet rulers could bring on world wer III at any time by leastehing forces they now have ready.

This then is the situation that confronts us: the communists are continuing their aggression in Korea; they are doing it with the approval of the Kremlin; and the aggression could spread at any time, enymbers in the world.

These are the facts, and I want everyone in our country to understand them clearly, because our situation is one of grave danger, and we must all stand together.

Our situation, however, is by no means desperate.

We and our allies have strong and well-trained military .

foreces, which we are rapidly enlarging.

We and our allies have great and dynamic occasic strength, which we are steadily increasing.

Above all, we and our allies have on our side the immense moral force of freedom. We stand for the individual dignity of man, and that upholds our will and gives us millions of petential allies behind the Iron Curtain.

Our objective is clear: to establish the rule of justice in the world -- for that is the only way to lasting peace.

In Mores, we shall fight on to stop aggression. We shall do so in whatever manner and by whatever mans are calculated to advance the world objective of peace under international justice.

guard. We do not know what moves the communist generals will make, but we are prepared for whatever may come. The United Nations command is fresh and rested; its morale is high; the sam know that their cause is vital to every person in this country and to the whole free world. The United Nations forces are ready to defend themselves against energy attack, or to take the offensive in Korea.

I am of course not going to ilocuse our military strategy with the Kremlin listening in. But certain facts are obvious.

There is a real possibility that the communists may launch major air attacks, using the air bases they have in Manchuria and the planes they have gathered there. If such attacks occur, and they threaten the security of the United Nation's troops, direct retaliation will of course be necessary.

the danger that the fighting may spread beyond Korea. Our desire is the same as it has been us do not wint to spread the fighting. We want to stop the aggression where it started, in Korea. But we shall have to be ready, as we have always been, to use whatever military means offer provise of bringing the fighting to a successful conclusion.

The fighting will necessarily be costly to the Chinese.

Thousands and thousands were Chinese soldiers will be killed or hurt as a result of the mad course their communist rulers have taken.

We regret this. We have no quarrel with the Chinese people. We would gladly make peace with them at any time. We

want to see them free and independent and at peace, under a government of their own choosing.

But as long as they persist in allowing themselves to be the dupes and puppets of rutiless men in Peiping and Moscow we have no choice.

The Chinese people will be hurt not only by the loss of their soldiers. Their economic system has been hurt already by the sharp economic restrictions we and other free nations have placed on trade between the mainland of China and the free world. The Chinese have been cut off from access to rubber, and oil, and wool and many other products they need. China is a land of vest poverty, and their present course can only add to that poverty. The free world will cut off more and more trade with the Chinese mainland. If the Chinese people expect to obtain from the Soviet Union what they can no longer obtain from the free world, they are doomed to disappointment. The Soviet Union sucks the lifeblood of its satellites for the evil purposes of the Kreulin. Alliance with the Kremlin brings death, not life.

must continue to build up military, economic and moral strength.

The great policy for security and peace on which we are embarked,
is designed to put us in the best possible position to meet and
counteract whatever course the Soviet rulers may take. We intend
to be ready to meet major war, satellite aggression, internal
subversion, rancous propaganda, or any other measures the Kremlin
may take.

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But our policy is not simply defensive. We want to do more than simply to maintain the status quo. We intend to change the situation, so that as time goes by the strength of freedom will grow and the Soviet threat will diminish.

That is why we have joined in building armed forces that can defend Europe and reduce the vulnerability of that area to attack.

That is why we are urging the establishment of stronger economic and political arrangements, cutting across the ancient boundaries of Europe, and creating there a progressively stronger community.

That is why we are joining in the fight against hunger and ill-health and illiteracy in the Middle East and Asia, in Africa and Latin

America — so that the people of those areas not only can shrug off communist subversion but also can add energy and skill to the strength of freedom. That is why we are doing our best to send words of truth and hope to the people behind the Iron Curtain — to let them know we have not forgotten that they, too, want to be free.

These and many more things we are doing to bring peace to a troubled world. They are practical, realistic steps that can move ahead, if we take them with courage and firmness.

So I say to all of you tonight in your homes: the situation we face, in Korea and all around the world, is dangerous in the extreme. But it can be mat, and met successfully, if we all work together. We know what we want to accomplish, and we know how to do it.

The months and years ahead of us will not be easy. They won't be easy for our fighting men in the front lines, in Europe, or in other parts of the world. They won't be easy times for those of us here at home, whether we work in a factory, on a farm, or in an office or store.

But always remember that what we are doing is right, and it is worth every sacrifice, because it concerns our liberty as free men.

Remember that our forefathers faced greater odds,
when they gained their freedom from an ancient tyrant, than
we do in establishing freedom against the threat of a new tyranny.

They won the freedom of our country by steady, unflinching hard word in the face of danger. We can do as well. We have the same clear purpose. We have the same abiding faith in Him who has given us our strength. We can win.

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